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ARGUMENT
In its Respondent's Brief, the Golf Club at Black Rock, LLC ("Golf Club") spends a
considerable portion of its argument, not defending the district court's interpretation of
"Property" in Section 27. 7 of the Black Rock Declaration, bu~ instead arguing that it qualifies as
Successor Declarant under the meaning of "Property" advanced by Appellants (collectively
referred to as "Sky Canyon") in their Appellants ' Brief. 1 The problem for the Golf Club,
however, is that the facts do not work in its favor under the correct construction of Section 27.7.
The requirements for Successor Declarant status are straightforward-in order to qualify,
one must take title to "Property" in a bulk purchase for the purpose development and sale. The
Golf Club got as far as it did in this litigation only because the district court disregarded the fact
that the term "Property" as used in the Declaration is explicitly and unambiguously limited to
real property and ruled that "Section 27.7 is not limited by its terms to only 'real' property." R.
Vol. III, p. 764. This erroneous interpretation led the district court to conclude that the Golf
Club's purchase of Club Property, made for the admitted purpose of selling golf club
memberships, would satisfy Section 27.7.
The Respondent's Briefoffers no substantive defense of this ruling; it simply recites the
district court's conclusions and states they were correct. The Golf Club's attempt to defend the
decision on alternate grounds is a telling commentary on its lack of confidence in the district
court's reasoning. But in any event, no matter how the Golf Club argues this case, the facts do
not change. The Golf Club did not take title to any Expansion Property, and thus any argument in
this regard is a complete non-starter. It took title to Club Property only, and it did so for the
purpose of operating a golf course club on the Club Property's existing improvements.

1

That meaning, of course, being that "Property" unambiguously means real property.

1

These facts do not and cannot entitle the Golf Club to Successor Declarant status. This is
apparent from not only a point-by-point analysis of Section 27. 7' s requirements, but also from a
comprehtnsive review of the Declaration as a whole. For these reasons, the district court's error
was not just in granting summary judgment to the Golf Club, but also in denying summary
judgment to Sky Canyon, and thus the district court must be reversed on both counts.

I.

THE GOLF CLUB CANNOT RELY ON EXPANSION PROPERTY TO
ACQUIRE SUCCESSOR DECLARANT STATUS BECAUSE IT BAS NOT
ACQUIRED ANY RIGHTS TO ANY EXPANSION PROPERTY, LET ALONE
TAKEN TITLE TO IT.
Most of attention in the Respondent's Briefis devoted to the concept of Expansion

Property, but the Golf Club's attempt to justify its claim to Successor Declarant status by virtue
of Expansion Property fails because it never took title to any Expansion Property, whether it be
existing or potential. But this crucial omission does not stop the Golf Club from making the
unfounded claim that it satisfied the requirements of Section 27.7 ''through its acquisition of all
rights to 'Expansion Property."' Resp 'ts Br. at 20. Despite the obvious problem in asserting "all
rights" to property it does not hold title to, the Golf Club argues that it received a valid
assignment of all Declarant Rights, which includes the right to annex Expansion Property into
the Black Rock Project, and that this is equivalent to taking title to Expansion Property. This
argument fails for a number of reasons, all of which necessarily foreclose any possibility that the
Golf Club could attain Successor Declarant Status by virtue of Expansion Property.

A.

There Is No Evidence that Expansion Property Even Exists in This Case.

The concept of Expansion Property is relevant to the ultimate issue at stake here because
"Property," as defined in the Declaration, includes Expansion Property. The following is the
verbatim definition of"Property" set forth in the Declaration:

2

Includes the property described on Exhibit "A" and initially subjected to this
Declaration, and also refers to any Expansion Property that may be incorporated
in the Project from time to time and made subject to these Covenants pursuant to
the provisions of this Declaration.

R. Vol. I., p. 367, at§ 2.47. Thus, because the term Property includes Expansion Property, a
party who takes title to Expansion Property in a bulk purchase for the purpose of development
and sale may qualify to be a Successor Declarant pursuant to Section 27.7.
So what exactly is "Expansion Property"? The Declaration contains a definition for this

term as well:
Such additional real property now owned or in the future acquired by Declarant
(including any Successor Declarant) as Declarant may make subject to the
provisions of this Declaration, by duly recorded Declaration of Annexation.

Id. p. 365, at § 2.31. This definition is plain and unambiguous. Real property cannot qualify as
Expansion Property unless it is capable of being annexed into the Project, and annexation cannot
occur unless and until the property is owned by someone with Declarant status. It therefore
necessarily follows that the only way acquisition of Expansion Property could confer Successor
Declarant status on a party is if a previous, qualifying Declarant had already acquired the real
property. Declarant status must come before ownership, otherwise the real property cannot meet
the definition of Expansion Property.
Thus, contrary to the Golf Club's assertion, there most certainly is a dispute as to whether
"'Expansion Property' includes property yet to be identified." Resp 'ts Br. at 33-34. It is legally
impossible to take title to unidentified real property, and thus the Golf Club is incorrect when it
asserts that "[t]he right to designate future 'Expansion Property' is itself 'Property."' Resp 'ts Br.
at 23; see also Idaho Code§ 9-503; e.g., City ofKellogg v. Mission Mountain Interests Ltd., Co.,
135 Idaho 239, 244, 16 P.3d 915, 920 (2000) ("As a general rule, a written instrument purporting
to convey real property must contain a sufficient description of the property.").

3

Expansion Property must be identifiable, and in this case, the Golf Club has not identified
any real property as Expansion Property. Its argument that '"Expansion Property' includes
property that is not yet identified or owned" is contradicted by the plain language of Section
2.31. Resp 'ts Br. at 23 n. 4. There is no evidence in the record of this case that the original
Declarant ever owed any real property outside of the Project that was or could have been
designated as Expansion Property, thus there is no evidence that any Expansion Property exists

in this case.

B.

The Golf Club Did Not Acquire Any Rights Over Expansion Property.

The Golf Club's argument as to Expansion Property is entirely dependent on it holding
the Declarant' s right under Section 16.1.2 of the Declaration to improve and annex Expansion
Property. But the Golf Club has gotten ahead of itself by asserting that it has acquired any rights
regarding Expansion Property, especially the Declarant Rights. Sky Canyon has always disputed
the Golf Club's authority to exercise the Declarant Rights; this is what the entire litigation is
about. Yet the Golf Club nevertheless begins its analysis by conclusively asserting that it
acquired the Declarant Rights, and as a result the entire argument crumbles.
The Golf Club has not acquired any of the Declarant Rights. The only reason we are even
discussing whether the Golf Club took title to Expansion Property is to analyze whether the Golf
Club was qualified to receive an assignment of Declarant Rights under Section 27. 7. Thus, a
valid assignment of Declarant Rights is the end goal of this analysis, not the starting point. By
making this the starting point of its analysis, the Golf Club has engaged in circular reasoning, as
this graphic represents:
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The Golf Club did not take title to any Expansion Property, and as a result it did not and
cannot acquire any of the Declarant Rights. It is presumptive and simply incorrect for the Golf
Club to assert that it can exercise the Declarant Rights over Expansion Property.

C.

The Golf Club Has Not Taken Title to Any Expansion Property.

Ultimately, the Golf Club's argument as to Expansion Property fails because it is
undisputed that the Golf Club has never taken title to any real property other than the Club
Property. R. Vol. I, p. 116, at 15 :9-17. The Golf Club may make numerous assertions that it
"acquired" or "purchased" Expansion Property,2 but these assertions are simply untrue and it is
patently absurd to argue that Sky Canyon is "missing the point" by highlighting this lack of title.

Resp 'ts Br. at 23 n.4. Sky Canyon is not missing the point; the Golf Club's failure to take title to
Expansion Property is the point.
2

Resp 'ts Br. at 24 ("The 'Club Property' and the 'Expansion Property' were purchased 'in bulk' with all related
personal and real property components.); id. at 25 ("[W]hether dealing with the 'Expansion Property,' the 'Club
Property,' or both the 'Expansion Property' and 'Club Property,' there is no disputed issue of fact that the same were
acquired by the Golf Club ...."); id. at 27 (The facts are undisputed that following its acquisition of the Club
Property and the Expansion Property, the Golf Club developed a Membership Plan and sold some 172
memberships.").
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The plain language of Section 27.7 requires a qualifying Successor Declarant to actually
take title to Expansion Property. The Golf Club's argument that it acquired "rights to" Expansion
Property is irrelevant became the only rights that matter are the ones that come with title, and
title is undisputedly absent in this case. This is the end of the analysis, 3 and it is the reason why
the Golf Club has absolutely no claim to Successor Declarant status by virtue of Expansion
Property.

II.

THE GOLF CLUB CANNOT RELY ON ITS ACQIDSITION OF CLUB
PROPERTY TO CONFER SUCCESSOR DECLARANT STATUS BECAUSE THE
CLUB PROPERTY WAS NOT PURCHASED IN A BULK PURCHASE FOR
DEVELOPMENT AND SALE.
The only "Property" that the Golf Club took title to was the Club Property, and this

acquisition was not a bulk purchase for the purpose of development and sale, and thus this
argument also fails to satisfy the requirements of Section 27. 7. fu ruling otherwise, the district
court erroneously concluded that "Property" was not limited to real property and erroneously
concluded that sale of golf club memberships would suffice. The Appellants' Brief explains indepth why this was in error, and nothing in the Respondent's Brief shows otherwise. It is
undisputed by the facts on the record that the Golf Club did not purchase the Club Property with
a goal to develop and sell the real property. The Golf Club's claims of"dual" or "parallel"
purposes are unpersuasive.

A.

The GoH Club's Acquisition of the Club Property Was Not a Bulk Purchase.

The Golf Club alludes in its Respondent's Briefthat Sky Canyon has abandoned its
argument that no bulk purchase took place, but that is not the case. As Sky Canyon argued in the

Appellants ' Brief, "[a]cquisition of property not suitable for subdivision and platting into
individual or multiple residential lots for sale to multiple owners is not a bulk purchase."
3

Title issue aside, it is worth noting that the Golf Club's managing member testified that the Golf Club had no plans
to annex property into the Project. R. Vol. I, p. 116, at 15:5-8.
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Appellants' Br. at 23. The Club Property acquired by the Golf Club is not capable of such
development, and thus could not have been acquired in a "bulk purchase."
This is clear from the definition of "bulk" Sky Canyon argued before the district court in
this case. The phrase "bulk purchase" is not defined by the Declaration, but the ordinary
dictionary definitions provide guidance. When used as an adjective, Black's Law Dictionary
defines "bulk" as "not divided into parts." BLACK'S LA w DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). MerriamWebster similarly defines "bulk" as ''the main or greater part -

in bulk 1: not divided into parts

or packaged in separate units 2: in large quantities." www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bulk
Qast visited January 23, 2013). Thus, the purpose of buying property in bulk, just like buying
anything in bulk, is to divide the whole into separate packaged units for resale. In the case of the
real property within the Project, a bulk purchase is to be followed by platting the bulk property
into individual lots to be sold.
Here, the Club Property was not bought in bulk because the real property purchased was
not undivided property with no distinct, individual components. At the time of purchase, the
Club Property was divided amongst five parcels that were each developed for their own distinct
purpose within the golf club. One parcel houses the clubhouse, one parcel provides beachfront
access, one parcel is golf course holes 1-9 and 16-18, one parcel is golf course holes 10-15, and
one parcel is a portion of the road leading to the clubhouse. R. Vol. p. 90-91. Each parcel has a
necessary role to play, and thus the Club Property is divided and was not purchased in bulk.

B.

The Golf Club's Acquisition of the Club Property Was Not for the Purpose
of Development and Sale.

The Golf Club's intention as to the use of the Club Property is clear. Its managing
member Roger Rummel explicitly stated in his affidavit that
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the intention was to develop and sell memberships for use of the 'Club Property.'

Specifically, it was the Golf Club's desire to develop and sell memberships in and
to the 'Club Property' on terms acceptable to all in order to create a vibrant and
collegial golf course and recreational community atmosphere.
R. Vol. II, p. 470-71, at W 18-19.)
All of the evidence supports this stated intent. The prior owner had already developed a
golf course, clubhouse, and other recreational facilities on the Club Property, and that golf club
had been operational for several years. Id. p. 469, at 110; R. Vol. I, pp. 113-15, 9:19-10:9. The
Golf Club intended to carry through with running a golf club on the Club Property, and it began
taking steps towards that end before it even took title to the Club Property. The Club Property
was not conveyed to the Golf Club until October 29, 2010, yet by as early as September 8, 2010,
the Golf Club had already drafted and prepared its Membership Agreement (Initial Offering), as
evidenced by the date at the bottom of said document. Id. p. 629, 639 & 663. It also began
accepting deposits for memberships prior to its formation. R. Vol. I, p. 113, at 8:3-23.
These facts do not comport with a bulk purchase of real property for the purpose of
development and sale. The Club Property had already been developed into a golf and
recreational club that was fully operational prior to the Golf Club's acquisition. Contrary to the
Golf Club's assertion, a developed golf club is not "raw land." Resp'ts Br. at 25. It was
developed property with a clubhouse, eighteen (18) holes of golf, and other recreational
facilities. See R. Vol. II, p. 467, at1f 8; id. p. 469, at, 10. By its own admission, the Golf Club
took title with the intention of maintaining that existing improvements on the Club Property in
order to operate its own business. This is not a "bulk purchase" made for development and sale
of the purchased property. While the continued operation of a golf course on the Club Property is
certainly a permitted use, it is not sufficient to confer Successor Declarant on the owner.

8

C.

The Golf Club's "Dual"/"Parallel" Purposes Argument As to the Use of the
Club Property Cannot Stand.

Because the evidence overwhelming supports the conclusion that the Golf Club did not
intend to develop and sell the Club Property at the time it took title, the Golf Club attempts to
save itself by asserting that it had "dual" or "parallel" purposes for the use of the Club Property.
Essentially the Golf Club argues that it had an alternate purpose in mind, a backup plan so-tospeak. If its golf club business failed at some point in the indeterminable future, then it would
consider redeveloping the Club Property for residential purposes. But for the purposes of
determining whether the Golf Club is entitled to Successor Declarant status, this argument
cannot stand.
First, the only purpose that is relevant to this analysis is the primary purpose for the Golf
Club's purchase of the Club Property. Section 27.7 requires that ifthere be a purpose for
development and sale, that purpose must be in place when title is acquired. Contingent purposes
are irrelevant because they can always be abandoned or changed at some point in the future. For
example, if in the future the operation of the golf club is not financially sound, the Golf Club
may decide to sell the Club Property to another party who will continue operating the golf course
rather than redevelop it for another purpose. In fact, Roger Rummel's own testimony indicates
that this was the Golf Club's actual contingent intent:

Q.

Are you aware of a right of first refusal that was granted to members in the
Golf Club under the Membership Plan?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Can you explain your understanding of that right of first refusal to me?

A.

My understanding of it is that if the current investor group decided to sell
the property that the existing members would have the right of first refusal
to purchase it.

Q.

Why was that inserted into the Membership Plan?
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A.

It was requested by the members to have it in there, and we agreed to it.

Q.

Is it your understanding that that right of first refusal would also come into
play if the Golf Club limited liability company decided to remove the golf
course?

A.

I would say so, yes.

Q.

So at that point the offer would be made to the members to buy the
property; is that my understanding?

A.

Yes.

R. Vol. I, p. 19, at 31:1-23.
Second, to call these "dual purposes" is misleading because they are mutually exclusive
and cannot co-exist. One must take precedence over the other, and in this case it is clear that the
desire to "create a vibrant and collegial golf course and recreational community atmosphere"
controls, as the Golf Club has already sold at least 172 memberships towards this end. R. Vol. II,
p. 470, at, 18. Redevelopment of the Club Property cannot occur "in tandem with the operation
of the golf course" because then the members would have no place to play golf. Resp 'ts Br. at
3 5. In any event, Mr. Rummel testified that, eight months into taking title, the Golf Club had no
plans to develop the Club Property. R. Vol. I, p. 122, at 44:11-13; id., p. 115, at 11:12-17; id. p.

116, at 14:13-17.
Finally, if contingent, unrealized backup plans were allowed to satisfy Section 27.7's
"development and sale" requirement, then as a practical matter the requirement would be
abolished because there would be no way to challenge the legitimacy of a contingent purpose.
This case is a perfect example of this. All of the evidence points towards the Golf Club's intent
to leave the existing golf club and recreational facilities in place, yet the Golf Club conveniently
asserts that it may still redevelop the Club Property in the future. If this argument is accepted,
then a party could take title for any purpose whatsoever and immunize itself from challenge by
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simply reserving the right to change its mind at some point in the undetermined future. As was
discussed in-depth in the Appellants' Brief, the "development and sale" requirement of Section
27. 7 is not a frivolous requirement. It is there to ensure that Declarant Rights are only exercised
by those who comport with the overall purpose of the Black Rock Development. The Golf
Club's dual intent argument would undermine this purpose, and thus it must not be allowed.

D.

The GoHClub's "Duel/Parallel" Purposes Argument Ignores the Restrictions
of the Black Rock PUD.

Finally, the Golf Club's claim that it intends to get into the business ofreal estate
development in the event its golf course is not profitable is not a credible claim in light of the
significant restrictions the Black Rock PUD places on the Club Property. Despite the Golf Club's
attempt to downplay this significance of the Black Rock PUD, it is nevertheless a binding
development restriction. As is discussed in the Appellants' Brief, the Black Rock PUD approved
a planned unit development of 381 single family dwellings and an 18 hole golf course and
recreational facilities on the Property.

If the Club Property were to be changed from a golf course to some other use, this change
would have to be approved by the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners. Considering that
the owners of over three hundred surrounding residential lots took title in reliance on recorded
plats and the Black Rock PUD, all of which provide for a golf course on Club Property, such a
change could not easily be accomplished. This barrier discredits the Golf Club's claim that it has
a contingent intent to dabble in real property development.

III.

THE OVERALL PURPOSE OF THE DECLARATION WOULD BE
THRWARTED IF THE GOLF CLUB ATTAINED SUCCESSORDECLARANT
STATUS.
The Golf Club cannot attain Successor Declarant status because it cannot satisfy all of the

individual requirements for a qualifying assignee: (1) title to Property, (2) in a bulk purchase, (3)
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for the purpose of development and sale. As discussed herein, the Golf Club never took title to
any Expansion Property. And the Club Property that it did take title to was acquired as a whole
for the purpose of operating a business on the existing improvements, not in a bulk purchase to
be further developed and sold as individual and distinct lots. Thus, when each of the components
are broken down and analyzed point by point, the Golf Club comes up short. This is the correct
result in this case, because the Declaration, viewed as a whole, does not contemplate a scenario
where the Project is controlled by a for-profit outfit that took title to developed Club Property for
its own commercial interests, as opposed to a self-directed homeowners' association for this fully
developed, completed project.

A.

Club Property is Different from the Rest of the Project, and Thus Its
Ownership Must Not Confer Successor Declarant Status.

As set forth in the Appellants' Brief, merely owning Club Property is not the role of the
Declarant. Club Property is different from the remainder of the real property in the Project, and
the Declaration accounts for this is numerous ways.
1.

The Declaration Contemplates that the Declarant Will Not Own the Club
Property.

First, the Declaration contemplates that the Club Property will be owned by someone
other than the Declarant, and in fact prior to the deed in lieu of foreclosure transaction, the Club
Property was owned by The Club at Black Rock, L.L.C. R. Vol. I., p. 363-64, at§§ 2.17 & 2.22.
Thus, when the purported assignment of Declarant Rights to the Golf Club took place, it was not
accompanied by a conveyance of the Declarant's real property. This alone is problematic given
that the primary role of the Declarant is to create the develop the Project, and yet neither the Golf
Club or its predecessors-in-interest held title to the Declarant's real property.
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2.

The Declaration Explicitly States that the Club Property Is Not Common
Area.

Second, the Club Property is explicitly not Common Area, and thus the Association
(which is composed primarily of residential lot owners) does not have the rights and
responsibilities to the Club Property that it has over the remainder of the Project. R. Vol. I, p.
363, at§ 2.17; id. p. 425-26, at§ 17.1; id. p. 373-74, at art. 7. Granting the Golf Club the right
to exercise Declarant Rights, which includes the ability to control the entire Association, would
be a windfall to the Golf Club because it would confer all of the benefits and none of the
downsides.
3.

The Club Property Was Not Intended to be Residential.

Third, it is apparent that the Club Property was never intended to be residential real
property, which further evidences that the owner of Club Property should not control the
residential portion of the Project. The Black Rock PUD was approved based on the
representation that the Project would contain an 18-hole golf course. See R. Vol. Ill, p. 927. The
recorded plats also specifically designate the Club Property for non-residential uses. The original
plat designates the location of golf course holes 1-9 and 16-18, as well as the Clubhouse, and
the Seventh Addition designates the location of golf course holes 10-15. R. Vol. I, p. 129; id. p.
283.
The Declaration also clearly states that the Club Property (which is defined as the real
property owned by The Club at Black Rock, L.L.C.) will be the location of the golf course
planned in the PUD:

17.1. Club Property. The golf course planned by Declarant will be privately
owned and operated by the Club and is not a part of the Common Area hereunder.
Id. p. 425-26, at§ 17.1.
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Thus, the Golf Club's claim that there is no factual support for Sky Canyon's assertion
that the Club Property was not intended to be residential is not true. The Golf Club is also being
evasive by claiming there is no support for the assertion that the Club Property is not fully
developed. Roger Rummel testified that the golf club's "number one intention" is to "remain as a
golf club," and there was no plans to develop the Club Property. R. Vol. I, p. 122, at 44: 11-13;

id., p. 115, at 11 :12-17; id. p. 116, at 14:13-17. The fact that the owners of the Club Property
intend to retain the golf club and do not have plan to develop the Club Property is evidence that
the Club Property was fully developed as a golf course and club at the time of the purchase.
4.

The Declaration Contemplates That the Owner of Club Property and the
Declarant Have Distinct Voting Rights.

Finally, the Declaration's provisions regarding the voting rights of Association members
also contemplates that the owner of Club Property and the Declarant will be separate entities.
There are three classes of membership in the Association: Class A, Class B, and Class C. Id. p.
369, at§ 5.2. Class A is composed of the owners ofresidential lots, who receive one (1) vote per
lot. Id. § 5 .2.1. Class B is composed solely of the owner of Club Property, who receives no more
than ten (10) votes. Id. § 5.2.2. Class C is composed solely of the Declarant, who receives ten
(10) votes for each lot it owns during the Period of Declarant Control. Id. § 5.2.3. After the
Period of Declarant Control, if the Declarant retains any lots, it becomes a Class A member. Id.
This voting scheme set forth in the Declaration clearly shows that the source of the
Declarant's control over the Association is ownership of non-Club Property, i.e., residential lots.
Acreage aside, in this sense the Club Property certainly is a small portion of the Project, given
that the Project was approved for up to 381 single family dwellings. Here, the Golf Club owns
only the Club Property, and thus it is entitled to only ten (10) votes. Nevertheless, because the
Golf Club asserts that it is entitled to Successor Declarant status, it controls the appointment of
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the Association's Board of Directors and officers pursuant to Section 4.3. Id. p. 368, at§ 4.3.
This imbalance of power is not contemplated by the Declaration.

B.

The Rationale for the Period of Declarant Control Is Not Present in This
Case.

The Respondent's Brief focuses heavily on the fact that the twenty-year term for the
Period ofDeclarant Control has not expired. However, focusing on this issue to the exclusion of
everything else is problematic because the Declaration does not contemplate a scenario where
the party claiming Successor Declarant status owns only the Club Property. In the absence of a
qualifying Successor Declarant, the Period ofDeclarant Control loses its meaning and purpose,
and therefore must come to an end.
As was discussed in Part III.C of the Appellants' Brief, the role of the Declarant is to
plan, develop, and implement the Project. Declarant Rights are given in order to effectuate these
objectives. This progress is measured by development and sale of the non-Club Property, and
thus it is ownership of non-Club Property that is the justification for the Declarant's control. This
is evident from Section 2.43, which provides that the Period ofDeclarant Control ends on "the
date on which the Declarant has recorded the plats of all Expansion Property and sold 90% of the
Lots to owners other than the Declarant or Builder," as well as Section 5.2, which reduces the
Declarant' s voting share each time a non-Club Property lot is conveyed to another party. R. Vol.
I, p. 366, at § 2.43; id. p. 369, at§ 5.2.
The Golf Club is not concerned with the planning, development, and implementation of
the non-Club Property. The undisputed testimony is that the Golf Club's primary objective is to
operate its golf course on the Club Property for a profit. Where then is the justification for giving
the Golf Club all Declarant Rights until the expiration of the twenty year Period of Declarant
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Control? There is none, especially in light of the fact that the Golf Club cannot qualify as a
Successor Declarant pursuant to 27.7.
The Period ofDeclarant Control must end regardless of whether the twenty-year period
has expired. The only entity that qualified for Declarant status was the original Declarant, Black
Rock Development, Inc., and it voluntarily relinquished its claim to Declarant status when it
executed the "Assignment ofDeclarant Rights" and purported to assign all rights to Washington
Trust Bank. This separation between Declarant Rights and ownership of developable Project
properly terminates the Declarant's control over the Black Rock Community. For a specific
example of this, consider the Association memberships. When Black Rock Development, Inc.
relinquished its claim to Declarant status, the Class C membership group ceased to exist because
no non-Club Property lots were owned by any entity claiming Declarant status. As a result, Class
A members now have the voting majority power since the Class B member is entitled to only ten
(10) votes. With only ten (10) votes, the Golf Club is not entitled to a majority of votes within
the Association. The Golf Club must not be allowed to control the appointment of all Board
directors and Association officers for this same reason.
In sum, there is no need to for a Declarant in the Project as it currently exists. The only
party claiming Declarant status, the Golf Club, has no current intention of developing the Club
Property, and it does not hold title to any other real property within the Project that would allow
it to exercise Declarant Rights as to the real property. For all of these reasons, the Golf Club
should not be able to control the Association and single-handedly make all decisions on its
behalf.

16

CONCLUSION
The undisputed facts of this case reveal that the Golf Club does not and cannot qualify as
the Successor Declarant to the Black Rock Project, and as a result it cannot exercise the
Declarant Rights. This district court's ruling was in error, and this Court must reverse its grant of
summary judgment to the Golf Club as well as its denial of summary judgment to Sky Canyon.
Declarant Rights are not superfluous powers. It is apparent from the Declaration that
these rights exist in order to assist the Declarant in the development and sale of its real property
into residential lots. In this case, the Property has been fully platted into individual lots that have
been sold to lot owners such as the appellants, and thus there is no need for further development
and sale by a Declarant. For this same reason, there is no further need for the Black Rock
Homeowners' Association to be controlled by a Declarant. The Declaration contemplates that the
members of the Association will take control when the Declarant has completed its development
and sales.
The Golf Club has no role in the development and sale of Property, and thus there is no
justification for allowing it to exercise Declarant Rights. These rights do not exist to allow the
owner of Club Property to pursue the financial interests of its commercial golf club by
controlling the entire Association. When deposed regarding why the Golf Club wants Declarant
status, Mr. Rummel testified that it wanted control in order to protect its investment in the golf
club. R. Vol. I, p. 117, at 20:15-25.
The Declarant Rights exist for the betterment of the Association's members, the vast
majority of which are residential lot owners. The Golf Club mentions its $7 .5 million purchase
price in the Respondent's Brief, but the residential lot owners made financial investments in the
Project as well when they purchased their lots. The money these more than 300 lot owners have
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invested into the Project greatly exceeds $7.5 million, and the members must be allowed to
safeguard their own interest by taking control of the Association rather than being subject to the
owner of Club Property who is pursuing its own commercial interest.
For all of these reasons, Sky Canyon respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
district court and rule that the Golf Club does not qualify as the Successor Declarant to the Black
Rock Project and is not entitled to exercise any Declarant Rights. Sky Canyon also requests that
it be awarded attorneys' fees on appeal.

DATED this 24th day of January, 2013.
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Attorneys for Appellants
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